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[1] Nineteenth Century philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed a prison 
system known as the Panopticon which was arranged in such a way that a 
single guard could, at any given time, view the activities and whereabouts 
of any particular prisoner.1  Bentham designed the prison in such a way 
that the prisoners could never tell whether they were being watched.2  
Twentieth Century French philosopher Michel Foucault further considered 
use of the Panopticon as a means of societal control through fear in his 
seminal book Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison.3  Foucault 
viewed the Panopticon as representative of society’s change in the 
Eighteenth Century from a power structure which exercised control 
through public spectacle (e.g., public hangings and torture) to one which 
                                                 
*Steven B. Toeniskoetter earned his J.D., cum laude, from the University of San 
Francisco School of Law in 2006.  He would like to thank Professor Susan Freiwald for 
bringing this issue to his attention and providing comments and critiques on early drafts. 
1
 James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired 
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Wikipedia, Panopticon Definition, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panopticon (last visited May 09, 2007).  Panopticon literally 




 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195-228 (Alan Sheridan, trans., Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
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exercised control through constant, unseen surveillance.4  Cellular tracking 
data has the potential to function as a Panopticon – permitting a single 
entity to monitor the location (and thereby the activities) of any particular 
person without that person ever knowing.  Cellular tracking technology 
presents many potentially advantageous uses, not the least of which is the 
ability to track down a user during an emergency situation.  But like any 
powerful and invasive technology, the potential for abuse is also great.  
Government and private actors could use cellular tracking technology to 
track the movements of political opponents, members of unpopular 
groups, or every citizen in the country and ultimately control their 
activities through the fear of constant surveillance.  Current electronic 
surveillance law permits this type of abuse because of the lack of proper 
constraints on law enforcement’s acquisition of prospective cell site data.   
 
[2] New communications technology has always posed classification and 
regulation problems for courts and legislators; cellular technology is no 
exception. When Congress originally enacted the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),5 cellular technology was in 
its infancy and the ability to track users via their cellular telephones was 
rudimentary at best.  Congress could not have foreseen at the time that 
cellular technology could eventually be used to track individuals with the 
substantial accuracy now available.  
 
[3] Since the passage of the ECPA, a confusing patchwork (or “mosaic” 
according to one court6) of laws regulating cellular technology has 
emerged.  Courts have split on whether to permit government agents 
access to real-time cellular tracking information (“prospective cell site 
data”) pursuant to a “hybrid theory”7 application.  
                                                 
4
 Several authors have sought to apply Foucault’s ideas on surveillance to online and 
electronic surveillance.  See, e.g., Mark Winokur, The Ambiguous Panopticon: Foucault 
and the Codes of Cyberspace, CTHEORY.NET ONLINE JOURNAL, available at:  
http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=371; Boyle supra note 1.  
5
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). 
6
 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 958 (E.D. Wis. 
2006) [hereinafter Wisconsin Decision]. 
7
 The “hybrid theory” application refers to an application for prospective cell site data 
based upon the combined authority of a pen register order with that of a Stored 
Communications Act order.  See infra Section IV.  
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[4] This paper first discusses current cellular technology and related 
regulation in Section II.  Section III provides an overview of the statutes 
that govern cellular tracking technology and the cases that applied these 
statutes prior to 2005.  Section IV discusses recent cases that address the 
procedural standard applicable to government acquisition of prospective 
cell site data.  Section V contains my analysis of the statutory and 
constitutional framework applicable to law enforcement acquisition of 
prospective cell site data.  Section VI argues that Congress should fix the 
ambiguities in the law to provide certainty and security for cellular users 
and to prevent potential abuse of cell site data.  
 
II. CELLULAR TRACKING TECHNOLOGY 
 
[5] In order to evaluate the standards governing the acquisition of 
prospective and real-time cellular tracking data (hereinafter “prospective 
cell site data”8), it is necessary to first examine what sort of location data 
the government has used cell phone technology to obtain.  Unfortunately 
there is no definitive answer.  The court decisions addressing the issue are 
either unclear about what the government has actually been able to obtain 
or they contradict each other.  However, based upon the facts of several 
court decisions, the Enhanced 911 legislation (E-911), and several other 
materials, it appears that the government can obtain data that fairly 
accurately identifies the location of cell phone users.  An examination of 
the FCC’s Wireless Enhanced 911 service reveals the capabilities of 
current technology.  
 
A. ENHANCED 911 RULES 
 
[6] In 1996, the FCC began creating rules to ensure that cellular phone 
users would be able to connect to 911 operators through their cellular 
phones and that the 911 operators would be able to obtain the location of 
the cellular phone directly from the cellular service provider.  The E-911 
regulations, which are to be promulgated over time, require cellular 
service providers to provide certain minimum pieces of information to 911 
                                                 
8
 The courts discussing this issue use both the term “prospective cell site data” and “real-
time cell site data.”   As one court has discussed, the terms are not interchangeable.  See 
Section IV(C), infra.  I generally use the term “prospective cell site data” for this paper 
since “real-time cell site data” is a sub-category of prospective cell site data.  
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operators.9  In Phase I, which required implementation by April 1, 1998, 
cellular service providers were required to provide 911 operators with the 
location of the single “cell site or base station” which received the 911 
call.10  The cellular service providers merely had to provide the location of 
a single cellular tower, and emergency responders would know the cellular 
phone was within a certain radius of that cellular tower.  Factual 
recitations in recent court decisions reveal that at least some cellular 
providers also have the ability to provide the general direction and/or 
angle the cellular phone is in relation to the cell site.11  For ease of 
reference, I will refer to this type of location data as “single cell site data.”   
 
[7] In Phase II, the FCC required cellular service providers to provide 911 
operators with the location of a cellular phone by longitude and latitude.12   
The E-911 regulations provide two ways of meeting this requirement:  
network-based technologies and handset-based technologies.  Providers 
who decided on network-based technologies had to ensure accuracy of 
within 100 meters for sixty seven percent of calls and within 300 meters 
for 100 percent of calls by October 1, 2002.13  Providers who decided on 
handset-based technologies had to ensure accuracy of within fifty meters 
for sixty seven percent of calls and within 150 meters for ninety five 
percent of calls by October 1, 2001.14 
 
[8] The term “network-based technologies” refers to the use of 
triangulation to determine the general location of a cellular phone.  
Network-based technologies require that two or more cell towers receive a 
signal or signals from a cellular telephone at or about the same time.15   
                                                 
9
  47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006).  
10
 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(d)(1).  
11
 See, e.g., In Re Application Of The United States of America For An Order For 
Disclosure Of Telecommunications Records And Authorizing The Use Of A Pen 
Register And Trap And Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Gorenstein, 
M.J.) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. I]; Wisconsin Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 950.  
12
 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(e).  
13
 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(f) & (h).  
14
 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g) & (h). 
15
 Where only one cell tower has received a signal from a cellular telephone, the data 
provided is essentially single cell site data (i.e. a certain radius around a single cell 
tower).  For a more in-depth discussion of the different types of triangulation and a 
general discussion of E-911, see Darren Handler, Comment, An Island of Chaos 
Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. 
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Several recent court decisions reveal that in addition to the location of a 
single cell site, such data may also reveal which general direction and/or 
angle the cellular phone is in relation to the cell site.16  The accuracy of 
triangulation techniques generally improves with each additional cell 
phone tower that receives a signal at about the same time.  Consequently, 
triangulation technology is most effective in urban areas where cell tower 
density is high and much less effective in rural areas where cell tower 
density is low.17 
 
[9] The term “handset-based technologies” at this time seems to refer 
solely to GPS-based18 systems for determining the location of a cellular 
telephone.  A cellular provider using a GPS-based system uses a GPS 
receiver built in to the cellular phone handset itself to obtain the handset’s 
location, which is then transmitted to the 911 operator.19  Normal GPS 
accuracy is approximately within four to twenty meters, but that accuracy 
can be improved using several additional technologies to within ten 
centimeters.20  In contrast to triangulation technology, GPS tends to be 
more accurate in rural areas than in urban areas because the signal can be 
distorted by large buildings.21  
                                                                                                                         
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve Been?  Privacy 
Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 307, 308-10 (2004) [hereinafter Who Knows Where You’ve Been];  Laurie Thomas 
Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls?  Call Location Information and Privacy 
Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 384-88 (2003).   See also Wikipedia, 
Radiolocation Definition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiolocation (last visited May 9, 
2007) (describing the types of triangulation each major cellular provider currently uses).   
16
 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.. 
17
 One article has suggested there may be areas in which a single cell tower covers an 
area of several hundred miles.  Who Knows Where You’ve Been supra note 15, at 309.  
18
 GPS, which stands for Global Positioning System, is a U.S. Government-developed 
satellite system for determining a receiver’s location anywhere on earth.  See generally, 
Wikipedia, GPS Definition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS (last visited May. 9 2007) 
[hereinafter Wikipedia GPS Definition]. 
19
 See 911 Dispatch Monthly Magazine Online, GPS Location Technology Page, 
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/gps.html (last visited May 9, 2007).  
20
 Wikipedia, GPS Definition, supra note 18.   
21
 Id. This effect is called an “urban canyon.”  However, in major urban centers, this 
effect is lessened by the use of stationary GPS reference points called Wide Area 
Augmentation Systems.  See Wikipedia, Wide Area Augmentation System Definition, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wide_Area_Augmentation_System (last visited May 9, 
2007).  
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B. TYPES OF CELL SITE DATA AND THEIR AVAILABILITY 
 
[10] The E-911 legislation reveals that there are three types of cellular 
tracking data that government agents can potentially obtain from cellular 
providers. 
 
[11] In order from the most accurate to least accurate they are:  
 
(1) GPS data 
(2) Triangulation data 
(3) Single cell site data.22  
 
[12] There are eight times at which each type of data could be available:  
 
(1) Whenever a cellular phone is turned on 
(2) At the beginning of an outbound call  
(3) At the beginning of an inbound call 
(4) During an inbound or outbound call 
(5) At the end of an outbound call 
(6) At the end of an inbound call 
(7) At the beginning of a 911 call 
(8) At any time during a 911 call.23  
 
[13] It is unclear exactly when a cellular provider can itself obtain any of 
these three types of data.  For instance, the E-911 regulations merely 
require the cellular providers to provide GPS data when a cell phone user 
dials 911.24  It is unclear whether the provider may obtain and record GPS 
data whenever the cell phone is on or only while that person is on the 
phone with a 911 operator.25  In several recent court decisions, the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney’s (AUSA’s) application seeks tracking data only 
                                                 
22




 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(e).  
25
 Some cellular phones with GPS allow users the ability to turn off the GPS for all 
purposes but 911 service.  See, e.g., Sprint PCS Website, Sanyo 8200 User’s Guide at 65, 
available at 
http://www1.sprintpcs.com/media/Assets/Equipment/Handsets/pdf/sanyopm8200.pdf 
(last visited May 9, 2007).  
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at the beginning and end of calls26 while in several other court decisions, 
the AUSA seeks tracking data during a call as well.27   
 




[14] An examination of the law prior to recent decisions reveals the 
building blocks upon which the latest court decisions rest.  Accordingly, 
this section reviews the existing federal statutory scheme governing 
wiretapping, pen registers, stored electronic data, and tracking devices, as 
well as Fourth Amendment case law as it applies to tracking devices.  
 
B. WIRETAP ACT AND ITS PROGENY 
 
[15] In 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States (hereinafter 
Katz) broke new ground by finding that law enforcement agents needed a 
warrant before they could listen to a person’s telephone conversations.28   
The Katz court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not 
simply ‘areas….’”29  The Court, through a concurring opinion, adopted a 
new test for when communications would be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment:  Whenever a defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the communications and when that expectation of privacy is 
                                                 
26
 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Decision I, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Wisconsin 
Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Application Of The United States 
For An Order: (1) Authorizing The Installation & Use Of A Pen Register & Trap & Trace 
Device; & (2) Authorizing Release Of Subscriber Info. &/Or Cell Site Info., 411 
F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006) (Hornsby, M.J.) [hereinafter Louisiana Decision]. 
27
 See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site 
Location Authority, 396 F.Supp.2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter Texas Decision]; In 
re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information 
&/or Cell Site Info. (E.D.N.Y. Decision I), 384 F.Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); on 
reconsideration (E.D.N.Y. Decision II), 396 F.Supp. 2d 294, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).   For 
the purposes of this paper, I treat E.D.N.Y. Decisions I and II as the same decision.  
28
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
29
 Id. at 353. 
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objectively reasonable.30  The Katz court acknowledged the “vital role that 
the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”31 
 
[16] Within one year of the Katz decision, and in direct response to that 
decision, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (commonly referred to as the “Wiretap Act”).32  
The Wiretap Act generally forbade private parties from intercepting any 
covered communications, except with consent of the parties, and required 
law enforcement agents to follow strict procedural requirements in order 
to intercept wire communications.33   
 
[17] In response to another technological revolution, the proliferation of 
electronic mail, voicemail, and cordless and cellular telephones, Congress 
passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).34  
Title I extended most of the protections of the Wiretap Act to electronic 
communications, 35 Title II added a new section protecting stored 
communications and transactional records (known as the “Stored 
Communications Act” (SCA)), and Title III added a new section on pen 
registers and trap and trace devices (“Pen Register Provisions”).36   
 
1. STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
[18] The SCA regulates how government agencies may obtain 
transactional records and communications which have been stored 
electronically (i.e., communications obtained in a manner not 
simultaneous with their transmission).37   What follows is a distillation of 
                                                 
30
 Id. at 361. (Justice Harlan, concurring).  
31
 Id. at 352.  
32
 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) (2000)).  
33
 Id.  
34
 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).  
35
 While ECPA Title I generally extended the Wiretap Act to cover electronic 
communications, it explicitly exempts electronics communications from the statutory 
suppression remedy available to unlawful interception of wire and oral communications.  
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(10)(a) & (c).  An “aggrieved party” still has, however, 
constitutional remedies, if any apply.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c).   
36
 Id.  
37
 Id.   
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this complicated statutory scheme.38  The most relevant section for the 
present discussion, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (hereinafter “Section 2703”) splits 
stored records into three categories:  (1) communications stored less than 
180 days; (2) communications stored more than 180 days; and (3) 
transactional/subscriber information.39   Law enforcement agents can 
obtain communications stored less than 180 days solely with warrant,40 
whereas it can obtain stored communications more than 180 days old with 
a warrant, or on a showing of “specific and articulable facts [that the 
communications sought] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation,” or an administrative subpoena requiring notice to the 
subscriber.41  Finally, and most importantly for the present discussion, law 
enforcement agents may obtain transactional records with either a warrant 
or a showing that there are “specific and articulable facts showing that [the 
records sought] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”42   
 
2. PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS 
 
[19] The Pen Register Provisions regulate how and when law enforcement 
may install pen registers and trap and trace devices.43   A pen register is a 
device (now usually a piece of software) that “records or decodes dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information (DRAS) transmitted by an 
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is 
                                                 
38
 For a lengthy explanation of the intricacies of the SCA see Orin S. Kerr, Symposium, A 
User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending 
It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004) (classifying the SCA’s treatment of content/non-
content records differently than I have); see also Deidre K. Mulligan, Symposium, 
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004).  
39
 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).  
40
 Id. § 2703(a).  
41
 Id. §§ 2703(b) & (d).  
42
 Id .§§ 2703(c) & (d).  Subscriber records, a very narrow class of records defined in the 
statute, are obtainable through an administrative subpoena.  Id.  
43
 18 U.S.C. § 3121-3127.  Courts and commentators often use the term “pen register” to 
refer to both pen registers and trap and trace devices, probably because the “device” is 
usually the same piece of software.  Thus all references to “pen register” hereafter refer to 
the combination of a pen register and a trap and trace device, unless otherwise noted. 
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transmitted.”44  A trap and trace device provides essentially the same data 
as a pen register - except that it records incoming DRAS information.45  
By definition, DRAS information excludes the contents of electronic or 
wire communications.46 
 
[20] A court receiving an application for a pen register from a law 
enforcement officer or a U.S. Attorney must grant the application so long 
as it is complete.47   The only substantive element of the application 
requires that the applicant must certify that “the information likely to be 
obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”48  Law enforcement officers have no obligation ever to 
disclose the existence of a pen register,49 and even if they were to do so, 
aggrieved parties have no statutory suppression remedy, as they have for 
defective wiretap applications.50  
 
3. TRACKING DEVICE STATUTE 
 
[21] One final statutory provision worth mentioning because of later 
courts’ reliance upon its language is 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (hereafter the 
                                                 
44
 Id. § 3127(3).  Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, pen registers were much more 
limited in their scope.  The prior version of the statute defined a pen register as “a device 
which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed 
or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached…”  18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1988) (amended 2001).   
45
 Id. § 3127(4).  
46
 Id. § 3127(3).  
47
 Id. § 3123(a) See also Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes 
After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 972 note 113 (1996) 
(examining the treatment of communications attributes in electronic surveillance law 
before and after CALEA, the debate over the scope and treatment of “call setup” 
information, and foreshadowing the present issue over law enforcement acquisition of 
prospective cell site data).  
48
 115 Stat. 278, 288-89.  
49
 In fact, the Pen Register Provisions explicitly forbid service providers who receive pen 
register orders from disclosing the existence of such an order to the target.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3123(d).   In the author’s own experience, however, the existence and records of a pen 
register are usually disclosed in discovery if the investigation results in a criminal 
indictment since the government will often use the pen register evidence at trial.   
50
 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2006).  Under current Fourth Amendment case law, an 
aggrieved party doesn’t have a constitutional suppression remedy either.  See discussion 
of Smith v. Maryland in Section III(B)(3), infra.  
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“Tracking Device Statute”).51  The Tracking Device Statute empowers a 
court, which is otherwise authorized to issue warrants, to issue a warrant 
for the installation and use of a tracking device within its own jurisdiction, 
as well as use of the device outside of its jurisdiction.52  The legislative 
history of this statute shows that it was meant only to clarify jurisdictional 
issues relating to the authorization of a tracking device and “does not 
affect current legal standards for the issuance of such [a tracking device] 
order.”53  As shown below in Section V(B)(4), caselaw and an amendment 
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have abrogated any particular 
relevance this statute may have had.   
 
C. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
[22] As described above, the Supreme Court in Katz held that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not places.”54  A line of cases followed 
that interpreted the Katz reasonableness standard in light of the 
government’s use of sensory enhancement equipment, including “beepers” 
and other tracking devices.55   
 
[23] In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that “a person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”56  
Because the “beeper” revealed no more information than standard visual 
surveillance, the search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.57  The 
following year in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court revisited the 
practice of law enforcement use of beepers, but this time the beeper 
entered into a private residence.58  The Karo court recognized the sanctity 
                                                 
51
 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006).  
52
 Id.  
53
 S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 34 (1986).  
54
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
55
 For more on the use of “beepers” and other tracking devices, see generally Timothy 
Joseph Duva, Comment, You Get What You Pay For…And So Does the Government: 
How Law Enforcement Can Use Your Personal Property to Track Your Movements, 6 
N.C.J.L & TECH. 165 (2004); Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the 
Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 277 (1985).  
56
 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
57
 Id. at 282.  
58
 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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of a person’s residence and reiterated that “[s]earches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable….”59  The court 
ultimately held that “[warrantless] monitoring of a beeper in a private 
residence . . . violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a 
justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”60 
 
[24] More recently, the Supreme Court refined its position on the use of 
sensory enhancement in United States v. Kyllo.61  The law enforcement 
agents in Kyllo had used a heat-sensing imager to get a “crude visual 
image of the heat radiated from outside the house” which the agents then 
used, with other information, to procure a search warrant for the house.62  
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the sanctity of the home in 
Fourth Amendment analysis: “‘[a]t the very core’ of the Fourth 
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”63  The five 
member majority held that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use.”64  The Court 
recognized that while the actual technology law enforcement agents used 
in that case was not particularly accurate and did not reveal much 
information about what was happening inside of the home, a warrant 
would protect citizens from more intrusive technology “already in use or 
in development.”65 
 
[25] In 2003, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the government’s 
warrantless acquisition of cell site tracking data violated the Fourth 
                                                 
59
 Id. at 714-15.  
60
 Id. at 714.  
61
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).   
62
 Id. at 30.  For more on the technology used by law enforcement in this case and other 
related technologies, see Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun?  A 
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 
507, 540-44 (2005).   
63
 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).  
64
 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).  Kyllo was a close case with an unusual five member 
majority: Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and 
Breyer joined him.  
65
 Id. at 35-36.   
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Amendment rights of the cellular phone owner.66  The law enforcement 
agents in United States v. Forest had successfully petitioned for a Title III 
Wiretap order to obtain communications from defendant Garner’s phone.67  
The order also required the service provider to disclose “all subscriber 
information, toll records and other information relevant to the 
government’s investigation.”68  
 
[26] While visually tracking the defendants driving in their car, the agents 
lost sight of the defendants.69  An agent then called Garner’s cellular 
phone several times, but did not let it ring, in order to obtain cell site data 
from the cellular provider.70  The agents used the cell site data to regain 
visual contact with the defendants and they arrested the defendants on 
drug charges the following day.71  
 
[27] The defendants in Forest challenged the acquisition and use of the 
cell site data under both the Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment.  It is 
unclear on exactly what grounds under the Wiretap Act the defendants 
attacked the use of the cell site data since they did not challenge the 
validity of the court-approved wiretap order in place. Nonetheless, the 
court held that the cell site data the agents acquired was not a 
“communication” under the Wiretap Act, and even if it were a 
communication, the defendants had no suppression remedy because the 
“communication” was best characterized as an electronic 
communication.72  In addressing the defendants’ claim that the cell site 
data turned the cellular phone into a “tracking device” under the Tracking 
Device Statute, the court held that the Tracking Device Statute provided 
no statutory suppression remedy because it does not prohibit the use or 
                                                 
66
 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 174 (2004), 
reversed on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).   
67
 Id. at 947. 
68
 Id.  
69
 Id.   
70
 Id. at 948.  The call to the defendant’s cell phone presumably generated a single cell 
site data record.  
71
 Id.  
72
 Id. at 949.  As stated in note 28, supra, the Wiretap Act excludes from the statutory 
suppression remedy all “electronic communications.”  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(10)(a) & 
(c) (2006).  
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installation of a tracking device with or without a warrant or through 
another statutory means.73   
 
[28] Turning to the Fourth Amendment, the court found the facts 
comparable to Knotts, and implicitly distinguishable from Karo, in that the 
agents tracked the cell site data only while the defendant was traveling on 
public highways.74  While the court recognized that Garner may have had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-site data, the court 
nonetheless rejected his claim because the agents had obtained no more 
information than they could have by mere visual surveillance.75  
 
[29] Finally, several courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith v. Maryland, which held that acquisition of prospective cell site data 
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.76  Several years prior to the 
enactment of the ECPA, the Court examined the constitutionality of law 
enforcement’s warrantless use of a pen register.77  The police installed a 
pen register device on the defendant’s telephone, with the help of the 
phone company78 to capture the numbers dialed.   The Court first clarified 
that the police had not intruded into a constitutionally-protected space or 
invaded the defendant’s property, but rather that the facts were more 
analogous to Katz.  Following the Katz test, the Court held that the 
defendant could not have had either a subjective or an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed 
because such numbers were voluntarily conveyed to a third party.  
According to the Court, the defendant should have known that the phone 
company could record the numbers.79  
 
 
                                                 
73
 Forest, 355 F.3d at 950 (adopting the reasoning and holding of United States v. 
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C.Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000)).   
74
 Id. at 951-52.  
75
 Id. at 951.  
76
 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).   
77
 Id. at 736.  
78
 The Court defined the pen register device as “a mechanical device that records the 
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial 
on the telephone is released.”  Id. at 736 n. 1 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. 
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).  
79
 Id. at 745.  
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[30] Prior to August 25, 2005, no court in the United States had 
established the standard the government must meet to obtain a court order 
allowing prospective acquisition of cell site tracking data.  Magistrate 
Judge James Orenstein issued the first decision on the issue in E.D.N.Y. 
Decision I,80 when he found that, while the government may obtain 
historical cell site data based on the specific and articulable facts standard 
of the Stored Communications Act, it may procure prospective cell site 
data only after making a showing of probable cause.81  Shortly after this 
decision, Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith issued an extensive 
opinion, fully analyzing the issue and coming to the same conclusion as 
Magistrate Orenstein.82  Magistrate Orenstein, on reconsideration, issued a 
lengthier opinion several weeks later, relying in part on Magistrate 
Smith’s intervening decision.83  Because Magistrate Smith’s analysis in 
the Texas Decision forms the analytical basis for over a dozen subsequent 
cases in a short period, I describe that decision before noting where other 
cases have agreed, disagreed, or otherwise diverged.  
 
B. THE TEXAS DECISION 
 
[31] In the Texas Decision, the government applied for, among other 
things, (1) a pen register order; and (2) an order for subscriber records 
including 
 
the location of cell site/sector (physical 
address) at call origination (outbound 
calling), call termination (for incoming 
calls), and, if reasonably available, during 
the progress of a call.” [] Also sought [was] 
information regarding the strength, angle, 
and timing of the caller’s signal measured at 
                                                 
80
 E.D.N.Y. I, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
81
 Id. at 564. 
82
 Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
83
 E.D.N.Y. Decision II, 396 F.Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  
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two or more cell sites, as well as other 
system information such as a listing of all 
cell towers in the market area, switching 
technology, protocols, and network 
architecture.84 
 
[32] In setting the stage for its subsequent analysis, the court described the 
statutory scheme and related procedural standards as follows: 
  
• wiretaps, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (super-warrant); 
• tracking devices, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (Rule 41 probable cause); 
• stored communications and subscriber records, 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d) (specific and articulable facts); 
• pen register/trap and trace, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (certified 
relevance).85 
 
[33] The court began its analysis with the Tracking Device Statute, finding 
that it “appears at first glance to provide the most likely fit for cell site 
[data].”86  The court examined the statutory language and legislative 
history of the Tracking Device Statute and found that Congress had 
drafted the definition of “tracking device” broadly enough to cover the use 
of cell site data to track individuals.87   The government had argued that 
the use of prospective cell site data did not turn a cell phone into a 
“tracking device” because (1) the legislative history of the Tracking 
Device Statute showed the definition merely referred to “one-way radio 
‘homing devices;’”88 and (2) prospective cell site data does not provide 
detailed and precise location information.89   The court rejected this 
argument and found that Congress, by using a broader definition of the 
term “tracking device” under the Tracking Device Statute than that used in 
the legislative history’s glossary definition, meant to afford the term a 
broader meaning.90  According to the court, the precision or accuracy of 
                                                 
84
 Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749.  
85
 Id. at 753.  
86
 Id. at 753.  
87
 Id. at 754-55.  
88
 Id. at 753 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3564).  
89
 Id. at 755.  
90
 Id. at 754.   
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cell site data was immaterial because “§ 3117(b) does not distinguish 
between general vicinity tracking and detailed location tracking.”91  
Moreover, even if there were such a distinction in the statute, the court 
found that present technology does, or at least has the potential to, provide 
detailed and precise location information.92  
 
[34] The court then addressed the Fourth Amendment issues implicated by 
cell site data.  The court distinguished Smith v. Maryland on the grounds 
that, unlike dialed telephone numbers, “cell site data is not ‘voluntarily 
conveyed’ by the user to the phone company [but rather is sent] 
automatically . . . entirely independent of the user’s input, control, or 
knowledge.”93   The court found support for the proposition that the 
cellular phone owner retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
cell site data from a portion of the Wireless E-911 legislation.94  The 
statute provides that a consumer “shall not be considered to have approved 
the use or disclosure of or access to . . . [cellular] call location 
information,” except in an emergency situation or with the consumer’s 
prior consent.95  In dicta, the court acknowledged that some monitoring of 
cell site data may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment (i.e. when 
the user is traveling on public highways) but urged prosecutors 
nonetheless to obtain Rule 41 warrants to avoid any potential Fourth 
Amendment violations.96  Ultimately, the court held that “prospective cell 
                                                 
91
 Id. at 755.   
92
 Id. at 755.  The court further noted that the Department of Justice’s own manuals 
describe the common usage of tracking devices which use cellular towers and GPS, 
noting their precision.  Id. at 755.   
93
 Id. at 756. 
94
 See id. at 757. 
95
 Id. at 757 (quoting from 47 U.S.C. § 222(f)).  It would not be hard to imagine, 
however, that cellular services contracts may currently or in the future provide that the 
consumer expressly consents to disclosure of cell site data to third parties (e.g. for the 
purposes of location-based advertising).  Such a contract clause would seem to suggest 
that a user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information, and thus no 
Fourth Amendment protection.  On cellular location based advertising already in use, see 
Communicate Magazine, Big names deploy location-based marketing - location-based 
marketing via cellular phone, September 2001, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BKU/is_2001_Sept/ai_79125278  (last 
visited May 13, 2006).  Cf. Freedman v. American Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 
182-183 (D.Conn. 2005).   
96
 Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757.  
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site data is properly categorized as tracking device information under [the 
Tracking Device Statute].”97 
 
[35] The court next examined the Pen Register Provisions.  The court 
found that Congress, through the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA), had made its intent clear that pen registers, by 
themselves, could not be used to acquire location information.98  The 
pertinent section of CALEA provides that:  
 
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely 
pursuant to the authority for pen registers 
and trap and trace devices (as defined in 
section 3127 of Title 18), such call-
identifying information shall not include any 
information that may disclose the physical 
location of the subscriber (except to the 
extent that the location may be determined 
from the telephone number).99 
  
[36] The court dismissed the possibility that the “Super Warrant”100 
protections of the Wiretap Act apply to cell site data because such data 
does not constitute the contents of a communication.101  It similarly 
rejected the first two sections of the SCA on the basis that they also 
protected the contents of a communication.102  With regard to 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(c), which regulates access to transactional records, the court found 
that prospective cell site data did not fit the definition of “record[s] 
pertaining to ‘wire or electronic communications’” because the definition 
of “electronic communications” expressly excludes communications from 
                                                 
97
 Id.   
98
 Id. at 757-58 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2006)).  For a discussion of the changes 
made by CALEA to the existing statutory scheme see Freiwald, supra note 47.   
99
 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).  
100
 The term “Super Warrant” was coined by Orin S. Kerr.  See Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 607, 645 (2003).  
101
 Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
102
 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)&(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (2006)) 
(incorporating into the SCA the definition of “contents” from the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(8)).  
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a tracking device.103   The court also reasoned that the structure of the 
ECPA shows that the SCA was meant to apply only to existing records 
and not prospective records.104  The court came to this conclusion because, 
unlike the Wiretap and Pen Register Statute sections of the ECPA which 
provide precise time limits for use and renewal as well as for temporary 
sealing of orders, the SCA lacks time limits and does not require sealing of 
the order, presumably because revealing the existence of an SCA order 
would not disrupt ongoing surveillance.105  
 
[37] In support of its application, the government contended that the 
authority of a pen register order, combined with the authority of an SCA 
order, sufficed to authorize law enforcement to obtain prospective cell site 
data.  The government argued that cell site data is DRAS106 (specifically 
“routing” data) under the Pen Register Provisions.  It argued that, while 
under the restriction added by CALEA the government cannot obtain cell 
site data solely by using the Pen Register Provisions, it can nonetheless 
obtain such data if it combines the authority of the Pen Register Provisions 
with other authority.107  According to the government, this additional 
authority can be found in the SCA.108  Essentially this “hybrid theory” 
takes the prospective and DRAS features of the Pen Register Provisions 
and combines them with the legal standard and transactional records 
features of the SCA.  
 
[38] The court rejected the government’s hybrid theory argument on 
several grounds. First, it explained that the legislative history of the 
PATRIOT Act109 clarified that DRAS was meant merely to allow pen 
registers to obtain internet traffic data.110  Moreover, even if DRAS 
included more than just internet traffic data, the court reasoned that DRAS 
information must be “generated by, and incidental to, the transmission of 
                                                 
103
 Id. at 758-59 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C)).  
104




 See note 41 supra and accompanying text..   
107




 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2006). 
110
 Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62. 
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‘a wire or electronic communication.’”111  Since a user generates cell site 
data whether or not engaging in a wire or electronic communication, the 
court found that it was not included in the definition of DRAS.112  
 
[39] Again looking at legislative history, the court also found that 
Congress did not intend Section 1002 to change electronic surveillance 
law, but rather to clarify and reiterate the existing electronic surveillance 
regime regarding location data.113  It examined the statements of then-FBI 
Director Louis Freeh, who had testified at length in response to worries by 
privacy advocates that CALEA’s amendments would allow law 
enforcement to obtain cell phone tracking data via the Pen Register 
Provisions.  Specifically, Freeh testified that CALEA was not meant to 
“enlarge or reduce the government’s authority [regarding electronic 
surveillance],”114 that “‘transactional information’ is . . . exclusively dealt 
with in [the SCA],” and that CALEA did not relate to or affect the SCA.115  
Freeh’s disclaimer that law enforcement could not obtain location 
information through the use of a Pen Register was eventually codified as 
Section 1002.  Based on these statements, and the lack of cross-
referencing between the SCA and the Pen Register Provisions, the court 
held that Congress could not have meant the SCA to be the additional 
authority required under Section 1002 to obtain location data and thus 
rejected the “hybrid theory” application.116    The court concluded by 
noting that, should the government wish, it could surely apply for a Rule 
41 warrant in order to obtain the cell site data it sought.117  
 
                                                 
111
 Id. at 762 (citing 18 U.S.C. §3127(3) (2004)). 
112
 Id.  
113
 Id. at 765-66 (citing Freiwald, supra note 47).  
114
 Id. at 763 (quoting Joint Hearing on Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access 
to Advanced Telecommunications Technologies and Services: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Technology and Law of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. On 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 
2, 28 (statement of Director Freeh) (1994) [hereafter Freeh Statement];  see also 
Freiwald, supra note 47, at 976-82.  
115
 Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d at 764.  See also Freiwald, supra note 47, at 976-982 
(citing Freeh Statement, supra at 27-28.)  
116
 Id. at 764-65.  
117
 Id. at 765.  As noted below, several courts have denied an application for an order 
under the “hybrid theory” and then later granted the same order upon a showing of 
probable cause under Rule 41.   
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C. CASES FOLLOWING THE TEXAS DECISION 
 
[40] To date, more than a dozen decisions have come down either denying 
or granting the acquisition of real-time and/or prospective cell site data.  
At least seven of those decisions have generally adopted the reasoning of 
the Texas Decision, rejected the government’s “hybrid theory,” and denied 
the applications.118  Several of these decisions add additional important 
analysis and note small disagreements with the Texas Decision, which are 
discussed below.  
 
[41] The first court to rule on the issue following the E.D.N.Y. and Texas 
Decisions simply held that it was adopting the reasoning of those 
decisions and that the court and two fellow Magistrate Judges would not 
approve applications for prospective cell site data predicated upon the 
authority of the SCA, the Pen Register Provisions, or a combination of the 
two.119 
                                                 
118
 In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Cell Cite Information, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-
410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter D.C. Decision I]; 
In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order Authorizing The 
Installation & Use Of A Pen Register & A Caller Identification System On Telephone 
Numbers [Sealed] & [Sealed] & The Production Of Real Time Cell Site Information, 402 
F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005) [hereinafter Maryland Decision I]; In re Application Of 
The United States Of America For An Order Authorizing The Release Of Prospective 
Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter D.C. Decision 
II]; In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order Authorizing The 
Release Of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(Facciola, M.J.) [hereinafter D.C. Decision III]; Wisconsin Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 
(E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order 
Authorizing The Installation & Use Of A Pen Register &/Or Trap & Trace For Mobile 
Identification Number (585) 111-1111 & The Disclosure Of Subscriber & Activity 
Information Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter 
W.D.N.Y. Decision]; In re Application Of The United States Of America For Orders 
Authorizing The Installation & Use Of Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices On 
Telephone Numbers [Sealed] & [Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter 
Maryland Decision II]; In re Application Of The United States For An Order For 
Prospective Cell Site Location Information On A Certain Cellular Telephone, No. 06 
CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. II].  
119
 D.C. Decision I, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 
WL 3658531.  Magistrates Kay and Facciola joined in the decision. Magistrate Facciola 
has since weighed in twice on the issue.  See D.C. Decision II, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132; D.C. 
Decision III, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134.   
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[42] Magistrate Bredar soon clarified and narrowed the issues involved 
further when he elucidated the important distinction between “real-time” 
and “prospective” cell site data:  Prospective cell site data consists of all 
data recorded by a cellular provider after the issuance of, and pursuant to, 
a court order, whereas real-time cell site data consists of “a subset of 
‘prospective’ cell site information” that “refers to data used . . . to identity 
the location of a phone at the present moment.”120  Because the 
government had requested “real-time” cell site data, the court limited its 
holding to real-time cell site data, while suggesting that the analysis 
probably also applied to all prospective cell site data.121   
 
[43] The Maryland court also discussed in dicta the Fourth Amendment 
issues implicated by the acquisition of prospective/real-time cell site data.  
The government had argued that it was never required to obtain a warrant 
when acquiring cell site data because under Smith v. Maryland cell site 
information is “voluntarily” conveyed to a third party.122  The court briefly 
suggested that cell site data could be distinguished from numbers dialed 
since the cell phone automatically transmits such information, regardless 
of whether the user dials a phone and because most users likely aren’t 
aware they are transmitting their location.123  The issue of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in prospective cell site information is discussed 
further in Section V(B).   
 
[44] As the court recognized, however, since the government had asked 
for an order, it must have some statutory basis for granting that order.  
Since the SCA and the Pen Register Provisions do not provide that 
authority, the court concluded that when the government seeks an order 
authorizing the acquisition of real-time cell site data in the future it must 
present an affidavit showing probable cause per Rule 41.124  The court 
                                                 
120
 Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599.  The court provides an excellent 
example that shows the difference between the two concepts in footnote 5.   
121
 Id. at 605 n. 11.  Indeed, in a follow-up decision, Magistrate Bredar held that the 
reasoning of his initial decision on real-time cell site data applied equally to prospective 
cell site data.  Maryland Decision II, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 395.  
122
 Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 605 n. 12.  
123
 Id. (noting “I do not believe most cell phone possessors realize they can be located 
within 100-300 meters any time their phone is turned on.”).  See also Texas Decision, 
396 F.Supp.2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  
124
 Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 605.  
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noted that, immediately following its denial of the present application, the 
government presented an affidavit establishing probable cause under Rule 
41 and the court issued the requested order.125 
 
[45] Soon thereafter, the government tried a creative new approach, when 
it requested prospective cell site data by making a showing of “probable 
cause to believe that the requested prospective cell site information is 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”126  The D.C. 
court found this “meld[ing]” of the Pen Register Provisions standard with 
the constitutional probable cause standard to be amusing, but nonetheless 
inadequate.127   The court ultimately found that the “probable cause” 
language added nothing to the Pen Register Provisions application and that 
the showing did not meet the constitutional “probable cause” standard.128  
 
[46] Less than a month later, the government again sought an order for cell 
site data from the same magistrate judge, but this time it “set[] forth facts 
demonstrating probable cause to believe that the requested cell site 
information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” 
and submitted an affidavit regarding such facts by an investigating 
agent.129  The court found that, yet again, the government had missed the 
constitutional standard for probable cause:  The showing is probable cause 
                                                 
125
 Id. at 598 n. 1.  
126
 D.C. Decision II, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132,132-33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  The 
U.S. Attorney’s Office is a very well organized organization.  I assume for the purposes 
of this paper that all regional offices act in a concerted manner and that this new approach 
was not the result of a “rogue” office, but rather a shift in strategy directed by the main 
office.   
127
 Id. at 133 (“I am afraid that I find the government's chimerical approach unavailing. 
Indeed, and to keep the animal metaphor going, it reminds one of the wag who said a 
camel is a horse planned by a committee.”)   
128
 Id.  While the decision does not discuss Section 1002, it seems that the government, 
recognizing that it could not obtain cell site data “solely” through the Pen Register 
Statute, may have believed that by adding the words “probable cause to believe” it had 
invoked the Rule 41 standard and therefore added the additional authority Section 1002 
required to obtain cell site data.  
129
 D.C. Decision III, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).  This 
is one of just three cell site decisions where the court states (albeit in very general terms) 
the factual basis underlying the application.  Briefly, the affidavit of the investigating 
agent described an investigation of a suspected drug dealer and asserted that the 
government sought cell site information to determine the location of the suspect’s stash in 
another state.  
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to believe that the information sought is itself evidence of a crime, not that 
it is relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.130 
 
D. CASES REJECTING THE E.D.N.Y. AND TEXAS DECISIONS 
 
[47] Not all courts that have encountered this issue have agreed with the 
Texas Decision’s analysis – two courts have accepted the government’s 
“hybrid theory” while a third granted the government’s application on 
other grounds.131  In S.D.N.Y. I, the court first distinguished the facts 
before it from those of the then-existing decisions on three grounds:  (1)  
Whereas in the prior cases, the government had asked for cell site 
information during calls and perhaps even when no call was being made 
or received, here the government’s application asked only for cell site data 
at the beginning and end of each call; (2) whereas in the prior cases, the 
government had asked for triangulation data, here the government asked 
only for data from a single cell tower at a time (i.e. single cell site data); 
and (3) whereas in the prior cases the government had obtained the 
information directly, here the cellular provider would be required to give 
raw data to the government, which would translate the data into a 
spreadsheet.132  The court found these distinctions important because it 
meant the government could obtain only general location data and only 
when that user dialed the phone (i.e. “voluntarily transmitted” the cell site 
data).133  
 
[48] The court examined the Pen Register Provisions and found that the 
statute “would by itself provide authority for the order sought by the 
Government were it not for [Section 1002].”134  The court reasoned that 
the legislative history of Section 1002 shows that Congress understood 
                                                 
130
 Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.  
131
 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Louisiana Decision, 411 F.Supp.2d 
678 (W.D. La. 2006); In re  Application Of The United States Of America For An Order 
Authorizing The Installation & Use Of A Pen Register With Caller Identification Device 
& Cell Site Location Authority On A Certain Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 
666 (S.D. W.Va. 2006) (Stanley, M.J.) [hereinafter West Virginia Decision].  The West 
Virginia Decision is addressed separately in the next section.  
132
 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38.  It is far from clear that the means by which the 
government would obtain cell site data under the application in this case is any different 
from how it would have obtained cell site data in any of the other reported decisions.   
133
 Id. at 449-50.  
134
 Id. at 440.   
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that prospective cellular location data could, prior to the passage of 
Section 1002, be obtained under the Pen Register Provisions.135  Working 
backwards, the court first found that a pen register is the only physical 
device that could obtain prospective cell site data and therefore if Section 
1002 were meant to remove the government’s ability to obtain cell site 
data through using a pen register, whether combined with other authority 
or not, the government would have no means of obtaining prospective cell 
site data.136  Because it believed that Congress could not have meant to 
take away the government’s ability to obtain prospective cell site data, the 
court held that the term “solely pursuant” means that the government can 
obtain prospective cell site data “through some unexplained combination 
of the Pen Register Provisions with some other unspecified 
mechanism.”137  
 
[49] The court next turned to the SCA and determined that, under the plain 
language of the statute, cell site data is “‘information’ . . . in the form of a 
‘record’” because it is first created by the cellular provider and then sent to 
the government.138  The court rejected the theory that the “service” being 
provided by the cellular provider was that of a “tracking device” and 
instead held that the “service” was cellular voice and data services.139  
Finally, the court explained that, at least under the specific facts of the 
present case, the SCA could be used to obtain prospective cell site data 
because the service provider was storing the data before handing it to the 
government.  The court reasoned that even under a very narrow reading of 
the SCA, “the Government [could] present[] daily or hourly (or even more 
frequent) applications to the Court to obtain historical cell site data.”140  
                                                 
135
 Id. at 440-41.  
136
 Id. at 441-42.  18 U.S.C. § 3121 provides that government cannot install a pen register 
except under the authority of the Pen Register Statute (and, though not relevant here, 
FISA).  
137
 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43.  While it accepted the proposition that the Pen 
Register Provisions must be combined with some other “unspecified mechanism” to 
obtain prospective cell site data, the court seemed uncomfortable with this statutory 
interpretation, calling it “unsatisfying[]” and “unattractive”, but nonetheless adopted it 
because the alternative interpretations would lead to absurd results.  
138
 Id. at 447.  
139
 Id. at 444-45.  
140
 Id. at 447. This reveals an inherent problem with applying traditional principles of 
surveillance to electronic communications and related transactional information:  The 
difference between intercepting an electronic communication or related transactional 
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Further, the court reasoned if one accepts that the Pen Register Provisions 
are a necessary component for obtaining prospective cell site data, then the 
SCA is the perfect statute to combine with the Pen Register Provisions 
because together they allow the acquisition of “records” by a pen register 
device using the higher legal standard of the SCA with the time limit 
protections of the Pen Register Provisions.141 
 
[50] The court rejected any Fourth Amendment constitutional protection 
as applied in this case for several reasons.  First, the court reasoned 
information provided “in this District” consisted of only very general 
location data, as opposed to “pinpoint” data.142   The court distinguished 
Karo because the cell site data was not accurate enough to disclose the 
user’s location within a home and because, unlike Karo, “the Government 
does not seek to install [a] ‘tracking device:’ The individual has chosen to 
carry a device and to permit transmission of its information to a third 
party….”143   
 
[51] The court ultimately accepted the “hybrid theory,” at least as applied 
to the particular application the government presented.  Realizing that 
technology could and probably would change in the near future, the court 
limited its holding by restricting what information it would grant in the 
future under a “hybrid theory” application.  The court stated that in the 
future it would sign only orders that required the production of:  
 
(1) information regarding cell site location 
that consists of the tower receiving 
transmissions from the target phone (and 
any information on what portion of that 
                                                                                                                         
information and obtaining stored versions of the same electronic communication or 
related transactional information is almost nonexistent.  I discuss this issue in further 
detail in Section V(B)(3).  
141
 Id. at 448.  The court agreed that the SCA is “unsuited” for an order authorizing 
ongoing acquisition of cell site data because of its lack of time limitations and its 
retrospective nature but found that when combined with the Pen Register Statute, the 
SCA adopts the time limitations and prospective aspects of that statute.  Id. at 447-48.   
142
 Id. at 449.  
143
 Id.  The court cited Smith v. Maryland for this proposition, but did not reach the 
question of whether cell site data is “voluntarily conveyed” when the user is not making 
or receiving a call, since the government in this case requested only cell site data at the 
beginning and end of calls.  Id. at 449-50.  
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tower is receiving a transmission, if 
available); (2) tower information that is tied 
to a particular telephone call made or 
received by the user; and (3) information 
that is transmitted from the provider to the 
Government.144 
 
[52] The court concluded that, should the government wish to obtain any 
other or more exact cell site data, such as triangulation cell site data or cell 
site data during a call, it would need to “provide additional briefing on 
why such information is permissible under the relevant authorities.”145 
 
[53] One court has since followed and adopted the reasoning of this 
case.146  A Louisiana court also briefly examined the issue of GPS 
technology, finding that several cell phone companies, including Nextel, 
have cell phones that use GPS technology.147  However, since the 
government was not requesting GPS data, the court did not reach the issue 
of whether such information could be obtained through a “hybrid theory” 
application.  The court specifically limited its holding and expressly stated 
that the government was not allowed to obtain following information:   
 
(1) any cell site information that might be 
available when the user's cell phone was 
turned “on” but a call was not in progress; 
(2) information that would allow the 
Government to triangulate multiple tower 
locations and thereby pinpoint the location 
                                                 
144
 Id. at 550.  I do not find the court’s limiting language particularly helpful.  There is no 
practical difference between obtaining cell site data from a single cell site at the time a 
call is placed/received and obtaining cell site data from multiple cell sites during a call.  
For instance, law enforcement agents could create a software program that dialed the 
user’s cell phone every ten seconds and then hang up before the cell phone user actually 
heard a ring (the practice of “pinging” a phone.)  Each call would create a single cell site 
record which, in the aggregate, would provide the same cell site data as a pen register that 
recorded cell site data continuously.  See, e.g., Forest, supra note 66, at 947 (police 
“pinged” defendant’s phone several times, hanging up before the defendant’s phone 
rang).  
145
 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 480.  
146
 Louisiana Decision, 411 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006). 
147
 Id. at 681. 
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of the user; and (3) GPS information on the 
location of the user, even if that technology 
is built into the user's cell phone.148 
 
E. VARIATION ON THE THEME 
 
[54] One court has approved an application for prospective cell site data 
on completely different grounds than all others.  In the West Virginia 
Decision, the court held that, because the current possessor of the cell 
phone was not the subscriber, the Pen Register Provisions by themselves 
provided the required authority to obtain prospective cell site data.149  The 
current possessor of the cell phone was a fugitive who was neither the 
subscriber nor the owner of the phone.150  The court rejected the “hybrid 
theory” but granted the application because it found that, under the plain 
language of the statute, the exception in Section 1002 applies only to “the 
physical location of the subscriber.”151  Since the current “user” was not a 
“subscriber,” the court held that the exception in Section 1002 did not 
apply and therefore the Pen Register Provisions, by itself, provided the 




[55] The courts have split on whether a “hybrid theory” application (i.e. an 
application for an order under the combined authority of the Pen Register 
Provisions and the SCA) is sufficient to allow the government to obtain 
prospective and/or real-time cell site data.  The majority of courts that 
have addressed the issue have held, based upon the legislative history, the 
structure of the statutory scheme, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
that a “hybrid theory” application does not present the requisite authority 
for the government to obtain prospective cell site data.  Two courts have 
dissented, approving “hybrid theory” applications on the narrow 
                                                 
148
 Id. at 683.  
149
 West Virginia Decision, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D. W.Va. 2006).  
150
 Id. at 664.  It is unclear whether the fugitive had stolen the cellular phone or simply 
borrowed a friend’s cellular phone. 
151
 Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 
152
 Id. at 665-66.   This case did not really approve of the “hybrid theory” (indeed, it 
rejected the theory) but approved the application solely upon the authority of the Pen 
Register Statute under the narrow facts of the case.   
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applications before them, on the grounds that the Pen Register Provisions 
are a required component of any application for prospective cell site data, 
and that the SCA provides the additional authority required to obtain such 
data.  A third court has approved an application for prospective cell site 
data on the narrow grounds that the statutory exception embodied in 
Section 1002 did not apply because the “user” of the cell phone was not 
the owner or subscriber of that cell phone, and thus, the Pen Register 
Provisions by itself provided the requisite authority to obtain prospective 
cell site data.  To date, none of these decisions has been appealed, 
notwithstanding several courts’ suggestion to the government to do so.153  
 




[56] At this time the government does not seem to be able to obtain cell 
site data (or any other cellular tracking data) directly using its own 
devices.154  Since cellular providers are unlikely to voluntarily provide cell 
site data directly to government, the government must obtain an order 
directing the cellular providers’ assistance in obtaining cell site data.155   
 
                                                 
153
 See S.D.N.Y. II, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01 2006 WL 468300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  It seems the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office has made a conscious decision not to appeal any of these decisions.  I believe the 
reason for this is that many magistrate judges are unfamiliar with the issue and still grant 
“hybrid theory” applications without written opinions, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office is 
unwilling to risk negative higher court case law on this issue.  
154
 If the government could do so, it would not need to apply for an order requiring 
cellular providers to provide help to the government in obtaining this information.   
155
 While it seems one or more telecommunications providers have voluntarily provided 
some information to government agencies without a consumer’s approval (see, e.g., 
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, 
May 11, 2006 at 1A), this author believes cellular providers are unlikely to give law 
enforcement prospective cell site data voluntarily for three reasons: (1) The enormous 
costs of complying with multiple requests from law enforcement agencies across the 
country; (2) the existence of privacy clauses in end-user cellular phone contracts (see, 
e.g., T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, available online at http://www.t-
mobile.com/Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions&print=true, at 
paragraph 16 (last visited May 9, 2007)); and (3) the possibility of strong consumer 
backlash if consumers were made aware of the cellular providers’ actions.  
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[57] My analysis of which standard a court must apply in determining 
whether to grant an order authorizing the government to obtain 
prospective cell site data necessarily begins with dividing the issue into 
two parts:  the statutory requirements to obtain an order (discussed in 
Section V(B)) and the constitutional restrictions, if any, on obtaining such 
data without a court order (discussed in Section V(C)).   The statutory 
analysis assumes that, at least as to the acquisition of some cell site data, 
there are no constitutional restrictions.  Section V(B) analyzes the 
statutory basis for obtaining an order requiring cellular providers to 
provide the government with prospective cell site data.  In contrast, 
Section V(C) discusses constitutional restrictions, if any, on both the 
government’s independent acquisition of cell site data and upon its 
acquisition of cell site data through cellular service providers.156   
 
B. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
 
[58] As stated above in Section III(B), the statutory scheme setup by the 
ECPA (as amended) allows the government to obtain several types of 
electronic data:  (1) the contents of electronic communications (“Wiretap 
Act”);157 (2) stored communications, subscriber and transactional records 
(SCA);158 (3) dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information (“Pen 
Register Provisions”);159 and (4) tracking device data (“Tracking Device 
Statute”).160  I consider whether each section provides the necessary 
authority to obtain prospective cell site data below.  
 
1. WIRETAP ACT 
 
[59] The Wiretap Act seems to be a poor candidate for obtaining cell site 
data.  While the term “electronic communications” is defined very broadly 
                                                 
156
 There is no significant legal difference between the government obtaining cell site 
data directly or through the cellular provider.  In the latter case, the cellular provider acts 
as an agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes.  See Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 740, n. 4 (1979).   
157
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522 (2006).  
158
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).  
159
 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006). 
160
 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006).  
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under the Wiretap Act,161 the Wiretap Act covers only the interception (i.e. 
real-time acquisition) of the “contents [of electronic communications],” a 
term which is defined as “any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of [a particular electronic] communication….”162    
 
[60] Cellular telephones transmit an array of “communications” including 
voice communications, text messages, emails, instant messages, and other 
internet communications. The “contents” of these “communications” are 
spoken words (voice communications) and combinations of text and 
pictures (text messages, emails, instant messages, and other internet 
communications).  All of these “contents” are expressions created directly 
by humans and communicated to/from another human (directly or 
indirectly).163  Cell site data is an electronic communication in that it is a 
“transfer of . . . [a] signal . . . by a . . . radio” but it is not contents because 
it is automatically-generated data transmitted from a cellular handset – not 
a communication created directly by a human and communicated to 
another human.164  I disagree with Magistrate Smith and several other 
courts’ conclusion that, because the cell site data can be used to track an 
individual, that converts the cellular phone into a “tracking device” whose 
“communications” are exempted from the definition of “electronic 
communications.”165  
 
[61] Few, if any, cell phone users carry a cellular telephone for the 
purpose of sending tracking data to the cellular provider. Few, if any, cell 
phone users would consider their cell phone a “tracking device,” at least 
                                                 
161
 “Electronic Communications” is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate 
or foreign commerce, but does not include-- 
(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication made through a tone-only 
paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 
of this title); or (D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution 
in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds…” 18 
U.S.C.S. § 2510(12) (2000 & Supp. 2006).  
162
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).  
163
 See, Freiwald, supra note 47, at 957 (noting that “judges are used to thinking of 
communications as requiring two human parties,” but noting the blurry line between 
contents and non-contents.)  
164
 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000 & Supp. 2006).   
165
 See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747, 754 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  
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prior to learning about the cell site decisions discussed in this paper.  The 
primary use of a cell phone is to send voice and data communications 
from person to person.  Any cell site data sent from the cellular phone is 
merely data generated incidental to cellular communications and not 
communications themselves.166 
 
[62] Moreover, the definition of “electronic communications” specifically 
excludes “communications from a tracking device,” so even if it could be 
argued that cell site data turns a cellular phone into a “tracking device,” 
law enforcement could not obtain the contents of a communication (i.e. 
the cell site data) from that tracking device through the Wiretap Act.167  
 
[63] While the Electronic Frontier Foundation and other commentators 
have urged the courts to require a government agency seeking prospective 
cell site data to make the same showing and endure the same limitations 
imposed on the interception of electronic communications under the 
Wiretap Act,168 the law does not seem to support the Wiretap Act 
provisions as a basis for obtaining cell site data.   
 
2. PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS 
 
[64] Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001 the terms “pen register” 
and “trap and trace device” were defined narrowly under the Pen Register 
Provisions.169  Under the original ECPA version of the statute, a pen 
register was defined as:  
 
a device which records or decodes electronic 
or other impulses which identify the 
numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on 
                                                 
166
 See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 47, at 954 (“In general, communication attributes 
comprise information disclosing the event of the communication and fleshing out details 
of that event.”).  
167
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
168
 See Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
defendants, In re Application for Pen Register on Trap and Trace Device with Cell Site 
Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Memorandum from Susan 
Freiwald, Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law, to Author (2006) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Freiwald Memo].   
169
 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b) & (d) (2006).  
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the telephone line to which such device is 
attached, but such term does not include any 
device used by a provider or customer of a 
wire or electronic communication service 
for billing, or recording as an incident to 
billing, for communications services 
provided by such provider or any device 
used by a provider or customer of a wire 
communication service for cost accounting 
or other like purposes in the ordinary course 
of its business[.]170 
 
[65] The first part of the definition (the text before “but”) was changed by 
the Patriot Act to read “a device or process which records or decodes 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an 
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is 
transmitted.”171   
 
[66] This expanded definition, by itself, would seem to include cell site 
data since it is “routing [and] signaling information,” information sent 
from the handset which assists the cellular provider in routing the 
communications to and from the handset and transmitting such signals.172  
Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, however, Congress passed CALEA 
which added 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B).173  As discussed earlier, Section 
1002 provides that information disclosing the physical location of a 
subscriber (other than the phone number itself) cannot be obtained solely 
through the use of the Pen Register Provisions.174  There is no indication 
in the legislative history of the Patriot Act that the amendment to Section 
                                                 
170
 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), Pub.L. 107-56, Title II, 
§ 216(c)(1) to (4), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 290. 
171
 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).  
172
 See, e.g., Maryland Decision II, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting 
United States Telecom Ass’n. v. F.C.C., 227 F.3d 450, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (“[A] 
mobile phone sends signals to the nearest cell site at the start and end of a call.  These 
signals, which are necessary to achieve communications between the caller and the party 
he or she is calling, clearly are signaling information.”) (citations omitted).  
173
 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B); see generally Freiwald, supra note 47.  
174
 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added); Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747, 
757-58 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  
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3127(3) (adding DRAS to the definition of “pen register”) was meant to 
overrule Section 1002.175  Thus, while the Pen Register Provisions, as 
amended by the Patriot Act, seem by themselves to provide the authority 
for government acquisition of cell site data, that authority is explicitly 
limited by Section 1002.176   Additionally, the pen register definition 
explicitly exempts from its scope:  
 
any device or process used by a provider or 
customer of a wire or electronic 
communication service for billing, or 
recording as an incident to billing, for 
communications services provided by such 
provider or any device or process used by a 
provider or customer of a wire 
communication service for cost accounting 
or other like purposes in the ordinary course 
of its business.177 
 
[67] Cellular providers keep records of at least some cell site information 
by themselves for billing and “other like” business purposes, such as 
deciding where to build new cell sites or determining when to bill a user 
for “roaming” charges.178  If cell site data is collected regularly in such a 
manner, it is not within the scope of information a pen register is 
authorized to obtain.   
 
3. STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
[68] The Stored Communications Act provides authority to obtain “Stored 
Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records 
                                                 
175
 See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765.  
176
 One court has in fact already found that the authority of the Pen Register statute, by 
itself, is enough to obtain prospective cell site data. West Virginia Decision, 415 F. Supp. 
2d 663 (S.D. W.Va. 2006), discussed further in Section IV(D), supra.    
177
 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). 
178
 This author has spoken with two engineers in the cellular technology field about this 
issue, one of whom works for Nortel Networks and the other for a major Canadian 
cellular technology provider.  Each stated that he knew of several cellular service 
providers who record at least some cell cite data for billing and quality-assurance 
purposes. [Names withheld on request].  
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Access.”179  Under the SCA, stored records are split into three categories:  
(1) Stored communications stored less than 180 days; (2) stored 
communications stored more than 180 days; and (3) transactional and 
subscriber information.180   Since the SCA adopts the definition of 
“contents” from the Wiretap Act and since cell site data is not “contents” 
under the Wiretap Act, the first two categories of stored communications 
are irrelevant for this analysis.181  The government may obtain 
“subscriber” information using a simple administrative subpoena; 
however, subscriber information is limited to six narrow categories of 
information, none of which are related to cell site data.182 
 
[69] The final category of records under the SCA protects “transactional” 
records or “[r]ecords concerning electronic communication service or 
remote computing service.”183  An “electronic communication service” is 
“any service which provides users thereof the ability to send or receive 
wire or electronic communications.”184   An “electronic communication” 
has the same definition as in the Wiretap Act.185  This very broad 
definition includes transfers of “signals,” “images” or “data” through 
“radio,” which would seem to include cellular voice and data 
communications.186  Thus the SCA covers transactional records from 
cellular service providers.187   
 
[70] The next step is to determine what records are actually covered under 
the transactional records section of the SCA.  The legislative history 
shows that transactional records comprise “information about the 
customer's use of the service” other than the content of the user’s 
                                                 
179
 This is the official title of Chapter 121 of Title 18 of the United States Code.   
180
 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
181
 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (adopting, by reference, the definitions from the Wiretap Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2510); Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2005).    
182
 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.  
183
 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).  
184
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).  
185
 See supra note 146.  
186
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).  This definition also excludes tracking device communications, 
but this is irrelevant since I have rejected the notion that the acquisition of cell site data 
turns a cellular telephone into a “tracking device” whose “communications” are the cell 
site data.  See supra note 148.  
187
 Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.  
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communications.188  One court, addressing the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2709 
(covering FBI counterintelligence access to subscriber and transactional 
records), concluded that Section 2709 “does not require communication 
service providers to create records which they do not maintain in the 
ordinary course of business.”189   While this case describes the scope of 
the term “telephone toll billing records,” the same reasoning should apply 
to transactional records under Section 2703(c) – that is, the government 
may obtain through a Section 2703(c)(1) order only records that the 
cellular service provider creates and maintains in the ordinary course of 
business.190   
 
[71] Under this reasoning, the government should be able to obtain 
historical cell site data under Section 2703(c)(1) so long as that 
information is regularly created and maintained in the ordinary course of 
business.  Recent court decisions and publicly available documents do not 
specifically indicate how much data is recorded and how long that data is 
maintained.  However, it is clear that at least some cellular providers 
record and maintain cell site data since such data has been used in a 
variety of cases already.191  Cellular providers most likely keep at least 
                                                 
188
 S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 38, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592; Texas 
Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.  
189
 In Re Matter of Grand Jury Subpoenas to Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, 894 
F.Supp 355, 348-49 (W.D. Mo. 1995).  There is nothing to suggest that the subscriber 
and transactional data covered under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 is any different than that covered 
under Section 2703(c).   
190
 See, e.g., Freiwald Memo, supra note 168, at 5-6 (discussing In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena to  Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Mo. 
1995), and the applicability of the legislative history of Section 2709 to 2703.)  
191
 See, e.g., People v. Stovall, No. B172771, 2005 WL 977733 (Cal. Ct. App. April 28, 
2005) (expert testimony regarding suspect’s location at time of murder based upon 
Verizon billing records showing defendant had made and received several calls using two 
cell sites in the vicinity of the murder location); People v. Pese, No. A100933, 2004 WL 
899768 (Cal. Ct. App. April 28, 2004) (cell phone records showed defendant made 
several calls using cell sites in vicinity of the location where victim’s body was found).  
See also examples in  Who Knows Where You’ve Been supra note 15, at 310-12.   The 
author has worked on a large federal RICO conspiracy case where the government had 
obtained historical cell site records and planned to use such records as evidence that one 
or more defendants were in the vicinity of a crime scene. The author has also heard 
anecdotal evidence from several criminal defense attorneys who regularly represent 
clients in federal court that the U.S. Attorney’s Office regularly obtains such information 
for use as evidence at trial in serious felony cases.   
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some of this information for later analysis in determining trends in usage 
in order to determine the best methods of routing and where additional cell 
site towers are required.192   
 
[72] Unfortunately for the government, the structure and plain text (and 
title) of the SCA show that it is of a purely historical nature and therefore 
unfit for authorizing the acquisition of prospective and/or real-time 
records.  As noted by several courts, the SCA needs to be examined as part 
of the overall surveillance scheme setup by the ECPA.193   The Wiretap 
Act and the Pen Register Provisions necessarily cover real-time (or at least 
prospective) access to data, since they require “interception” – which has 
been construed by several courts to mean acquisition contemporaneous (or 
at least nearly contemporaneous) with transmission.194  Because they are 
prospective in nature, both the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register 
Provisions require that interception be authorized only for a limited time 
and because they reflect on-going investigations, they are at least 
temporarily sealed.195   In contrast, the SCA has no time limitations of any 
sort (other than relating to the standard required for obtaining the contents 
of stored communications stored for more or less than 180 days).  Thus, 
the plain statutory language of the SCA and the statutory scheme in which 
it was created show that the SCA was meant to cover the acquisition of 
solely retrospective – and not prospective – data.196 
 
[73] One final issue is worth discussing in the context of the SCA: The 
blurring of the line between “records” and “real-time” data.  If the 
government can obtain historical cell site data using an SCA order, what 
prevents the government from obtaining a new order every week, every 
day, or even every hour to obtain any records which have been created in 
                                                 
192
 T-Mobile’s own Privacy Notice contemplates future potential use of cell site data for 
commercial/advertising and service-related uses.  See What About Location-Based 
Services and Information, T-Mobile, Privacy Notice, http://support.t-
mobile.com/knowbase/root/public/tm22030.htm, (last accessed May 9, 2007).  
193
 See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 760.  
194
 U.S. v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039,1048-49 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 
302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); Steven Jackson Games v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 
457, 463 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1994).  
195
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(5), (8)(b) (1993 & Supp. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c) (1993 & 
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the time since the last order?197  Electronic information is converted into a 
“record” almost immediately.  If the service provider regularly keeps those 
“records,” what does the “pen register” device actually do?  Is it merely a 
piece of software that waits for new records to be created and transmits the 
new records to law enforcement on an ongoing basis?  Or does it actually 
“intercept” the data before it becomes a record and then send that 
information to law enforcement?   These questions remain unanswered.   
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note that, while the 
statutory language of the SCA may allow repeated orders on even an 
hourly basis, at some point a court is likely to enforce the spirit of the 
ECPA by finding this practice to be a de facto “interception.”  
 
4. TRACKING DEVICE STATUTE 
 
[74] Several court decisions have cited the Tracking Device Statute as a 
potential source of authority for obtaining an order authorizing the 
acquisition of real-time cell site data.198  While at first blush it seems like 
the most logical match, in reality the Tracking Device Statute does not 
authorize anything and is merely a left-over statute.   
 
[75] Prior to the passage of the Tracking Device Statute, Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 41 did not expressly authorize the monitoring of 
a tracking device outside of the jurisdiction which had authorized the 
order.199  The Tracking Device Statute thus clarified that, where a court 
was already empowered to grant a warrant for the installation of a tracking 
device, it could also authorize the monitoring of the tracking device 
outside of that jurisdiction.200  Since that time, Rule 41 has been amended 
to allow exactly what the Tracking Device Statute authorized.201    
 
[76] Additionally, as several courts have noted, the Tracking Device 
Statute “does not prohibit the use of a tracking device in the absence of 
conformity with the section . . . [n]or does it bar the use of evidence 
                                                 
197
 S.D.N.Y. Decision I, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
198
 See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. Decision II, 396 F.Supp. 2d 294, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Texas 
Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 743.  
199
 See United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2000); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 41; Lee, supra note 15 at 395.   
200
 Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 n. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (1993 & Supp. 2006).  
201
 Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 n. 2; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.  
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acquired without a [Tracking Device Statute] order.”202  The Gbemisola 
court examined the legislative history of the statute and found that 
Congress was aware that the Knotts holding allowed warrantless 
installation and monitoring of a tracking device on public highways.203  
Congress therefore knew of the lax constitutional limitations on the use of 
tracking devices in non-constitutionally-protected areas but did not expand 
the constitutional protection, other than to broaden the jurisdictional reach 
of a warrant.  
 
[77] The government has argued in several cases that cell site data is so 
imprecise that it does not “permit the tracking of the movement of a 
person or objective.”204  Any discussion of the precision or accuracy of 
cell site data in determining location in the context of the Tracking Device 
Statute is irrelevant for several reasons.  First, neither the plain language 
of the statute, nor the legislative history say anything about accuracy.205  
Second, technology is progressing at such a quick pace that any arguments 
that cell site data is not precise enough to count as a tracking device will 
soon become moot, if they are not already.206  Third, the fact that the 
government seeks the cell site data at all shows it is accurate enough to be 
of use (whether evidentiary or otherwise) to the government.   
 
[78] The Tracking Device Statute neither sets a requirement for the 
installation and monitoring of a tracking device, nor does it expand the 
constitutional protection against the use of tracking devices. As a result, it 
is not really a part of the statutory “scheme” setup by the ECPA and is 
therefore irrelevant to determining the proper standard the government 
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 See, e.g., Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758; Forest, supra note 66, at 950 (quoting 
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 Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 60 (1986)).  
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categorizing cell site data in the hands of service providers as information from a tracking 
device, because it does not provide “detailed” location information.”).  
205
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5. COMBINED AUTHORITY OF PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS AND STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
[79] Having determined that neither the Pen Register Provisions nor the 
SCA, by themselves, authorize the acquisition of prospective cell site data, 
I now turn to the “hybrid theory” set forth by the government in the 
several cases discussed above in Section IV.  The “hybrid theory” asserts 
that, while Section 1002 prohibits the acquisition of prospective cell site 
data “solely pursuant to” the Pen Register Provisions, the government 
merely needs to add some additional authority in order to get over the 
hurdle set up by Section 1002.207  The government has contended that the 
SCA provides such additional authority.208 
 
[80] Combining two statutes, neither of which individually authorizes 
something, to obtain the authority to authorize that thing is a novel idea.  
One commentator has attacked this theory on the grounds that “0 + 0 = 
0”.209   The government, in support of its hybrid theory, has never cited 
another similar arrangement, where two independent statutes are 
combined to obtain a result that neither authorizes separately.210  This 
“hybrid theory” is distinguishable from the regular practice of law 
enforcement of combining applications and orders for separate results.  
For instance, combining a Pen Register application and order in the same 
packet as a SCA application and order to obtain (respectively) the results 
of a pen register and some stored records is not problematic.  In that 
situation, the Pen Register Provisions independently provides the authority 
to obtain numbers dialed, whereas the SCA independently provides the 
authority to obtain stored records.   
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 See, e.g., id. at 603.  
208
 Id.  
209
 Freiwald Memo, supra note 168.  See also Press Release, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, New Case Reveals Routine Abuse of Government Surveillance Powers: Cell 
Phones Used to Track Users Without Probable Cause (Sept. 26, 2005) (“It’s as if the 
government wants the court to believe that zero plus zero somehow equals one.”), 
available at, http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_09.php#004002.   
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[81] Even more problematic, while they were originally enacted 
concurrently, the SCA and the Pen Register Provisions make no cross-
references to each other.211  The 1986 Congress which passed the ECPA 
must have known how to cross-reference statutes when needed, as it cross-
referenced both the Pen Register Provisions and the SCA with the Wiretap 
Act.212  If that Congress had meant for the two statutory schemes to be 
combined to obtain something neither authorized independently, it seems 
likely that Congress would have done so at that time.213  When CALEA 
amended the statutory scheme by adding Section 1002, it did so without 
adding any reference in Section 1002 to the SCA.  Presumably, the 1994 
Congress which passed CALEA would have explicitly made such a 
reference if had meant the term “solely pursuant to [the Pen Register 
Provisions]” to mean, without additional authority provided by the 
SCA.214  The more likely scenario is that Congress meant to leave the door 
open for a later statute which would authorize the acquisition of cell site 
data by the technical device known as a pen register but using a different 
standard.  Since the SCA existed in 1994 and its scope has not been 
enlarged enough since then to independently authorize the acquisition of 
real-time cell site data, the 1994 Congress simply could not have meant 
the SCA to provide the extra authority required under Section 1002.   
 
[82] Much has been said by courts and commentators about the testimony 
of then-FBI Director Louis Freeh during the congressional hearings on 
CALEA.215  Freeh testified that CALEA was not meant to “enlarge or 
reduce the government’s authority” but merely to “maintain[] the status 
quo”.216  If CALEA was meant to protect the status quo, and prior to its 
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 Id. at 764.  
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 See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (2006) (adopting, by reference, the definitions from the 
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passage the status quo included no device whereby the SCA and Pen 
Register Provisions could be combined to obtain prospective cell site data, 
it is hard to see how Section 1002 could authorize this new combination. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to merely recognize that Freeh 
never suggested that the Pen Register Provisions could be combined with 
another statute to obtain prospective cell site data, nor do the 
congressional reports on CALEA mention such a combination.   
 
[83] Thus, the plain language of the statutes, the structure of the statutory 
scheme, and common sense show that the “hybrid theory,” that is the 
combination of the authority of the Pen Register Provisions and the 
authority of the SCA to obtain prospective cell site data, is unsupported by 
the law.   
 
6. COMBINED AUTHORITY OF PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS AND RULE 41 
WARRANT 
 
[84] The final means of obtaining prospective cell site data is to use a Rule 
41 warrant.  Most of the courts addressing this issue have required the 
government to bring an application for a Rule 41 warrant with the 
requisite probable cause showing in order to obtain prospective cell site 
data.217  Rule 41 allows a law enforcement officer to obtain a warrant for:  
 
(1) evidence of a crime; 
(2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other 
items illegally possessed; 
(3) property designed for use, intended for 
use, or used in committing a crime; or 
(4) a person to be arrested or a person who is 
unlawfully restrained.218 
 
[85] In order to obtain a warrant, law enforcement must present evidence 
(through an affidavit or testimony) showing probable cause.219  Of the four 
                                                                                                                         
the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 
House Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 28 (statement of Director Freeh)).  
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326-27; Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2005); W.D.N.Y. 
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types of warrants, cell site data fits only one category: evidence of a crime.  
There is nothing in the ECPA or any other federal statute which prohibits 
the use of a warrant to obtain cell site data.   
 
[86] Law enforcement does not, however, seem able to obtain cell site data 
by itself, but must obtain it through the cellular provider.  To obtain cell 
site data, law enforcement officers need an order requiring the cellular 
provider to provide them with such information.  A warrant merely allows 
the search and seizure of evidence.  A warrant would allow a law 
enforcement officer to enter the premises and obtain the information 
directly from the cellular provider.  On the other hand, cellular providers 
can easily comply with a warrant for prospective cell site data by simply 
installing a piece of software which is, in essence, a pen register.   
 
[87] For all practical purposes, then, a Rule 41 warrant authorizing the 
search and seizure of cell site data for an individual is merely an order to 
the cellular provider to install its own pen register and send the results to 
law enforcement.   For this reason, the government may find it 
advantageous to apply for both a warrant and a pen register order at the 
same time, with the warrant providing the authority to use the pen register 
for the acquisition of prospective cell site data.  Ultimately, the 
government’s “hybrid theory” is correct, except that the additional 
authority required by Section 1002 is a Rule 41 warrant.  The difference in 
the “hybrid theory” here is that, whereas neither the SCA nor the Pen 
Register Provisions provide the authority to obtain the results (prospective 
cell site data), here the warrant provides the authority to obtain the results, 
and the Pen Register Provisions merely provides a physical device or 




[88] The Wiretap Act does not provide the authority for obtaining cell site 
data because it applies solely to “contents” of communications, and cell 
site data is not the “contents” of a communication.  The Pen Register 
Provisions do seem to provide the authority for obtaining cell site data, 
except for the fact that Section 1002 explicitly precludes the Pen Register 
Provisions from providing that authority.  The Stored Communications 
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Act provides the authority for obtaining historical cell site data that 
cellular providers regularly keep, but given its plain language and its 
context within the larger statutory structure of the ECPA, it cannot provide 
the authority for obtaining prospective cell site data.  The Tracking Device 
Statute is neither mandatory nor prohibits the installation and monitoring 
of tracking devices.  The Tracking Device Statute itself merely clarified a 
hole in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 41 which has since been 
filled.  The combination of the Pen Register Provisions and the SCA is not 
enough to obtain prospective cell site data since neither statute separately 
provides sufficient authority to obtain such data.  Moreover, the legislative 
history and the structure of the statutes do not support the contention that 
Congress ever meant for such a combination of authority.  Finally, a Rule 
41 warrant provides sufficient authority to obtain prospective cell site 
data.  A cellular provider is likely to implement a Rule 41 warrant for cell 
site data through the use of a device like a pen register, so law 
enforcement should combine a Rule 41 warrant application with a pen 
register application and order. 
 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
[89] Separate from the statutory issue is the issue of whether the 
acquisition of prospective cell phone tracking data implicates the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.  Prospective cell site data 
implicates two separate levels of Fourth Amendment analysis:  (1) 
Whether the cell phone user retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his cell site data; and (2) whether a cell phone user has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his location in a public or private place. 
 
[90] The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from searches and 
seizures where that individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and 
that expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.220  Knotts and Karo 
together hold that, while a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their location while in a public place, that person does retain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their location once they enter into a 
home.221  More recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the notion of the 
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home as a special constitutionally-protected zone in holding that a sense-
enhancing device constituted a search, notwithstanding that the device 
never intruded into the home.222  
 
[91] On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless 
interception of telephone numbers dialed does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.223  This is because, the court reasoned, a person could have 
no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in information (in that 
case, the telephone numbers) which has been “voluntarily conveyed” to a 
third party (there the telephone company), and the subscriber knows that 
the telephone company can and does record those numbers.224 
 
[92] The government has argued, relying on Smith v. Maryland, that cell 
site data does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because, like 
telephone numbers, it is “voluntarily conveyed.”225  The problem with this 
argument is that, unlike telephone numbers which the user must actively 
dial and send to the telephone company, cell site tracking data is 
automatically transmitted, regardless of whether the person is using the 
cell phone at the time.226  This information must be transmitted in order to 
use the device because the device must always communicate with a 
particular cell tower in order to receive incoming calls or make outgoing 
calls.227  Cell site data is not information which the user contemplates 
sending when walking or driving around with a cell phone, nor does the 
user ever enter this information himself, as is the case with telephone 
numbers.   Additionally, few cellular phone users are likely to know that 
their movements can be tracked with substantial accuracy at any time their 
cellular phones are turned on.228  Thus cell phone users seem to retain a 
subjective expectation of privacy.  
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[93] It could also be argued, relying on Knotts and Karo, that the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated by warrantless acquisition of prospective cell 
site data since it does not provide sufficiently accurate or precise 
information to show whether a person is inside a residence or in a public 
place.229  While this may or may not be true under current technology, it 
will not remain that way.  Technology advances at such a fast pace that 
legislation and even court decisions often cannot keep up.230  
Triangulation techniques and GPS technology are likely to continually 
improve to the point where law enforcement may be able to determine a 
person’s exact location within a residence.231  Even today, if the 
government seeks GPS information (which may or may not be transmitted 
automatically on a regular basis) from a cell phone handset the 
government may be able to determine the location of that handset within 
the home with a high degree of accuracy.232   
 
[94] An argument can also be made that users have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell site data due to privacy 
clauses in cellular service contracts and privacy policies.  For instance, T-
Mobile’s current Privacy Notice states that T-Mobile only discloses 
“location information [cell site data] to third parties when required to do 
so,” such as during emergency situations (when user has dialed 911), to 
law enforcement, or to a user’s guardian or immediate family members in 
emergency situations.233  Verizon Wireless goes further by stating, “We 
support notice and informed consent for the use of any personally 
identifiable wireless location and transactional information [cell site data]. 
We will not store this type of information beyond its normal useful life, 
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including for internal service evaluation and quality assurance purposes, 
except as required by law.”234 
 
[95] These privacy policies must be balanced against the [mis]-
information users obtain from television and film.  Films and TV 
programs, such as “CSI,” “24,” and “Enemy of the State” occasionally 
show government agencies tracking users quite accurately via their cell 
phones.  Since the films are purely fictional and end users have at least 
constructive notice of the cellular privacy notices, I believe users do have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell site data.  
 
[96] Ultimately the government is correct that a cell phone user has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location in a public place.  
However, because a cellular phone user retains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his cell site data, and because technology will soon improve to 
the point where cell site data is likely to show a person’s location within a 
home, this argument is immaterial: Obtaining prospective cell site data 





[97] The statutory scheme setup by the ECPA does not directly address the 
acquisition of prospective cell site data.  The Wiretap Act covers only 
“contents” of communications and cell site data is not “contents.”  The 
Pen Register Provisions seem to cover prospective cell site data, but cell 
site data is exempt from its coverage by CALEA.  The SCA covers 
historical cell site data but not prospective cell site data. The “hybrid 
theory” – using the combined authority of the Pen Register Provisions and 
the SCA – is flawed because neither statute provides the requisite 
authority by itself for acquiring prospective cell site data and there is no 
indication that Congress meant for these two statutes to be combined for 
this purpose.  Therefore, because the government seeks an order, the 
default is a Rule 41 warrant.  A Rule 41 warrant authorizes the acquisition 
of prospective cell site data.  A Rule 41 warrant can also be combined 
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with a pen register application and order to use the mechanism of the 
physical pen register device to obtain the results authorized by the Rule 41 
warrant.   
 
[98] The Fourth Amendment does provide some limits on the acquisition 
of prospective cell site data.  Because cell site data is not actively given 
over to the cellular provider through affirmative acts of the cellular phone 
user, cell site data is not “voluntarily conveyed” to the cellular provider.  
Thus a cellular phone user retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his cell site data.  Any argument that the accuracy of existing technology 
prevents the government from determining an individual’s location within 
a residence is a short-term technology-specific argument which will 
become moot in the near future as technology improves.  Moreover, 
cellular privacy policies enforce the users’ reasonable expectation of 
privacy.   
 
[99] In sum, where law enforcement seeks to obtain an order authorizing 
the acquisition of prospective cell site data, it can do so only through a 
showing, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 41, of probable 
cause to believe the prospective cell site data is evidence of a crime.  Any 
warrantless acquisition of prospective cell site data, whether through a 
“hybrid theory” order or merely without any order, is unsupported by law 




[100] In this paper, I have examined law enforcement acquisition of 
prospective cell site data by first describing the relevant cellular tracking 
technology and related regulation, then examining the statutory schemes 
and case law regarding electronic surveillance and cell site data prior to 
2005, and finally analyzing the recent cases directly addressing the 
government’s “hybrid theory” for obtaining prospective cell site data.  
 
[101] I have concluded that under the current statutory scheme, the 
government must obtain a Rule 41 warrant in order to acquire prospective 
cell site data, whereas it need only obtain a SCA order to acquire historical 
cell site data.  In addition to the statutory limitations, the Fourth 
Amendment is also likely to impose restrictions on how and when law 
enforcement may acquire prospective cell site data.   
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
 49
[102] The cell phone has become an important part of everyday life for 
many Americans and has the potential to improve the lives of many 
people.  Innovation in cellular technology and cell phone usage may be 
stifled, however, if government overreaching and ambiguities in electronic 
surveillance law scare away end users.  The confusing state of electronic 
surveillance law relating to cell site data contributes to legal ambiguity 
and leaves the system open to abuse.  Moreover, abuse of the system could 
lead to a form of the Panopticon that even Jeremy Bentham himself could 
not have imagined.  Congress should step in to regulate the acquisition of 
prospective cell site data in order prevent abuse and encourage innovation 
in and adoption of cellular technology. 
